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Introduction 
Almost every week, a news article covers a different story that 
underscores our government’s preference—and the preference of society, 
more generally—for successful human trafficking prosecutions over the 
recovery and rehabilitation of trafficking victims. Whether it is coverage of 
a large-scale prostitution sting,1 or the prosecution of major sex2 or labor 
trafficking3 enterprises, our appetite for the enforcement of criminal human 
trafficking laws—especially sex trafficking laws—is quite satisfied. 
However, there is a certain group whose appetite for justice has gone 
unsatisfied for a long time—human trafficking victims. 
Following the U.S. government’s lead, most states are beginning to 
recognize their historical neglect toward the interests of trafficking victims, 
and accordingly, many have shifted their attention—at least in part—toward 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Press Release, Polk Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, PCSO Detectives Make 92 
Arrests During Four-Day-Long Undercover Prostitution Investigation (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.polksheriff.org/NewsRoom/News%20Releases/Pages/05-13-
2013PCSODetectives Make92ArrestsDuringFour-Day-Long.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 
2016) (describing the tactics used to investigate and arrest an underground prostitution ring) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 2. See, e.g., Max Kutner, Sex Slaves on the Farm, Newsweek (Feb. 5, 2015, 9:43 
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/02/13/sex-slaves-farm-304354.html (last visited Apr. 
16, 2016) (describing the intimidation used against women in sex slavery) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 3. See, e.g., Paul Vitello, From Stand in Long Island Slavery Case, a Snapshot of a 
Hidden U.S. Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/ 
03/nyregion/03slavery.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (discussing modern-
day slavery and the prosecution of involuntary servitude and peonage) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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satisfying those interests.4 In practice, however, we are seeing a lot of states 
“talk the talk” but not “walk the walk.” That is, many of the approaches that 
states have adopted to help human trafficking victims are making only a 
small difference to a lot of victims. 
This Article recognizes the need for change and urges states to adopt 
an overall approach that prioritizes the interests of trafficking victims to at 
least the same extent as it does the interests of combating human trafficking 
(and more specifically, combating human traffickers). As part of this 
overall approach, this Article proposes that states should enact affirmative 
defense statutes that excuse human trafficking victims for crimes that they 
commit as a direct result of being trafficked. In doing so, this Article frames 
its discussions, analyses, and arguments within the narrower context of sex 
trafficking, though practically, its analyses and arguments are just as 
convincing and applicable as applied to the context of human trafficking 
more generally. 
The trajectory of this Article can be mapped as follows: Part I begins 
with a general discussion of the problem of human trafficking in the United 
States. This discussion lays the foundation for Part II, which summarizes 
the United States’ current domestic human trafficking laws, focusing 
particularly on human trafficking laws at the state level. Part II also 
includes a summary and analysis of state statutes that allow human 
trafficking victims to vacate prior convictions for crimes that they 
committed as a result of being trafficked—commonly referred to as 
“vacatur statutes.” Part III transitions into a discussion of affirmative 
defenses outside of the human trafficking context and includes a discussion 
of the defense of duress. Part IV lays out several arguments for why states 
should provide trafficking victims with an affirmative defense and 
addresses the claim that an affirmative defense would create a moral hazard 
problem. Additionally, this Part provides some useful policy considerations 
to keep in mind before transitioning to an overview of states’ current 
trafficking victim affirmative defense statutes, which this Article provides 
in Part V. These statutes include ones that are limited to duress-like 
situations, ones that excuse only prostitution and related offenses, and 
broader ones that extend the defense to excuse non-prostitution-related 
offenses. After this overview, Part VI proposes the ideal state legislative 
model for a trafficking victim affirmative defense. In doing so, it argues 
that states should not limit their affirmative defenses to prostitution and 
related offenses but, instead, should extend their defenses to excuse non-
                                                                                                     
 4. See infra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
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prostitution-related offenses. Part VI closes by qualifying this Article’s 
proposal, urging states to adopt a collaborative approach that includes, but 
is not limited to, the adoption of a trafficking victim affirmative defense. 
I. Discussion of the Domestic Human Trafficking Problem 
Human trafficking is a serious problem that exists all over the world. 
The United States, among others, is considered a major destination country 
for human traffickers, as roughly 14,500–17,500 victims are trafficked into 
the United States every year.5 Sex trafficking in particular is a major subset 
of this industry—it brings in billions of dollars each year and is tied with 
trafficking in weapons as the second largest illegal enterprise in the United 
States.6 Most trafficking in the United States occurs in large metropolitan 
areas with high immigrant populations (immigrants are especially 
vulnerable targets for human trafficking),7 and it is most prevalent in 
California, Florida, New York, and Texas.8 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Toko Serita, In Our Own Backyards: The Need for a Coordinated Judicial 
Response to Human Trafficking, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 635, 636 (2012) (“The 
United States is considered a major destination country for traffickers, into which 
approximately 14,500–17,500 people are trafficked every year.”); Marisa Nack, The Next 
Step: The Future of New York State’s Human Trafficking Law, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 817, 822 
(2010) (describing that in New York, sex trafficking is most prevalent in industries with a 
demand for low-wage workers and little industry oversight). 
 6. See Theodore R. Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the 
Sex Trafficked Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
403, 409 (2011) (“Because of these exorbitant profits, the United Nations anticipates that 
human trafficking will surpass drug and weapon trafficking to become the world’s largest 
illegal business.”). 
 7. See id. at 415 (noting that, among other reasons, immigrants are generally easy 
targets for trafficking because (1) they are unfamiliar with the language and culture of the 
United States, and (2) they are often in the United States illegally, which makes them 
especially vulnerable to threats of deportation and fosters a general sense of distrust for law 
enforcement). 
 8. See id. at 410, 415 (“Scholars have cited the following causes of human 
trafficking: poverty, illiteracy, armed conflicts, economic crisis, globalization, gender 
inequalities and discrimination, low social status of women, lack of educational 
opportunities, restrictive immigration policies, lack of anti-trafficking laws (or lack of 
enforcement), and the demand of male sex buyers.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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II. Discussion of Current Human Trafficking Laws 
A. Current Criminal Human Trafficking Laws 
Recognizing that human trafficking—especially sex trafficking—is a 
major problem in the United States, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government, respectively, have enacted some form of 
legislation aimed toward eliminating human sex trafficking.9 As defined 
under federal law, sex trafficking is a form of human trafficking whereby 
one induces a commercial sex act through “force, threats of force, fraud, or 
coercion.”10 States have also adopted various definitions of sex 
trafficking.11 In addition to the general recognition of sex trafficking as a 
major domestic problem, there is a growing trend in the United States 
toward making victim recovery one of the end goals of such legislation.12  
Despite this trend, however, the criminal justice system’s intersection 
with sex trafficking frequently favors successful prosecutions over the 
rights and needs of trafficking victims.13 Additionally, trafficking victims 
are oftentimes characterized—and even targeted—as criminals because of a 
common practice among law enforcement personnel to place a heavy 
                                                                                                     
 9. See POLARIS PROJECT, A LOOK BACK: BUILDING A HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 1–2 (2014), https://polarisproject.org/sites/default/files/2014-Look-Back.pdf 
(describing national and statewide efforts to eliminate sex trafficking). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34 (McKinney 2015) (defining sex trafficking 
broadly as advancing or profiting from prostitution by providing drugs to impair a victim’s 
judgment; making false or misleading statements to induce a victim to engage in 
prostitution; confiscating, withholding, or destroying a victim’s passport or other important 
identity documents; keeping a victim in debt bondage; or using force, threats, and 
humiliation to make a victim engage in prostitution). 
 12. See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7105, 
7109 (2012) (comprising the TVPA’s three-pronged approach to combat trafficking: 
(1) prevention of the crime of trafficking; (2) protection of trafficking survivors; and 
(3) prosecution of traffickers); id. § 7101(b)(19) (“Victims of severe forms of trafficking 
should not be inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful 
acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as using false documents, entering 
the country without documentation, or working without documentation.”); Sangalis, supra 
note 6, at 418 (“[Congress] took a decidedly victim-centered approach to the [TVPA].” 
(citing Implementation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Int’l Relations, 107th Cong. 3 (2001))). 
 13. See, e.g., MELISSA DITMORE, SEX WORKERS PROJECT, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., THE 
USE OF RAIDS TO FIGHT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 36 (“From the perspective of law 
enforcement personnel, whether a raid is successful is determined by the collection of 
evidence rather than by positive outcomes for the people affected by the raid.”). 
182 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 177 (2016) 
emphasis on arrests for low-level misdemeanors, including prostitution.14 
This results in a large number of trafficking victims who are arrested for 
incidental offenses, which severely undermines the goals of facilitating 
trafficking victim recovery. 
B. Current Vacatur Statutes 
States are beginning to recognize the status quo’s neglect toward 
victim recovery and are taking legislative action. Leading the way in 2010, 
New York passed a law that allows victims of trafficking to file motions to 
vacate prostitution and related convictions that were direct results of having 
been trafficked.15 Since then, twenty-three states have followed suit by 
enacting laws that similarly allow trafficking victims to vacate or expunge 
certain convictions.16  
“Despite early praise for these laws, however, very few victims have 
exercised the new legal rights these laws created.”17 The shortage of relief 
provided pursuant to these vacatur statutes is largely the result of their 
ineffective and impractical structures. The following subpart analyzes New 
York’s vacatur statute and uses its flaws to demonstrate why similar statutes, 
in and of themselves, fall short of their stated purposes (i.e., assisting 
trafficking victims). 
                                                                                                     
 14. See SUZANNAH PHILLIPS ET AL., INT’L WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, CITY 
UNIV. OF N.Y. SCH. OF LAW, CLEARING THE SLATE: SEEKING EFFECTIVE REMEDIES FOR 
CRIMINALIZED TRAFFICKING VICTIMS 14 (2014), http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/ 
clinics/iwhr/publications/Clearing-the-Slate.pdf (“In addition to raids, common policing 
strategies, driven by the broken windows theory that unchecked minor crimes will lead to an 
increase in overall criminal activity, place a heavy emphasis on arrests for low-level 
misdemeanors, including prostitution.”). 
 15. See PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) 
(McKinney Supp. 2014) (providing that a defendant can file a motion for relief from 
judgment where the crime was the result of sex trafficking). 
 16. See POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING ISSUE BRIEF: VACATING CONVICTIONS 
1 (2015), https://polarisproject.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Vacating%20Convictions% 
20Issue%20Brief.pdf; see also PHILLIPS ET. AL, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing the state of 
human trafficking vacatur remedies); see also Annie Sweeney, Cook County Court Clears 
Sex Trafficking Victim of Prostitution Record, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-23/news/ct-met-prostitution-trafficking-adoption-
20130823_1_dreamcatcher-foundation-abusive-pimps-brenda-myers-powell (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2016) (“[P]eople who can show proof they were sexually trafficked, including those 
forced to work in prostitution, may petition to have related convictions cleared from their 
record.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
  17. Alyssa M. Barnard, Note, “The Second Chance They Deserve”: Vacating 
Convictions of Sex Trafficking Victims, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2014). 
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1. New York’s Vacatur Statute 
New York enacted section 440.10(1)(i) of the New York Criminal 
Procedure Law on August 13, 2010, to provide a post-conviction remedy 
for sex trafficking victims.18 Section 440.10(1)(i) allows courts, after the 
entry of a judgment for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging 
in a prostitution offense, to vacate such judgment if “the defendant’s 
participation in the offense was the result of having been a victim of sex 
trafficking” under either New York or federal law.19 The primary purpose 
of the law was to relieve trafficking victims of punishment for acts 
committed at the coercive direction of their traffickers and, in doing so, to 
provide such victims with the “second chance they deserve.”20 Additionally, 
section 440.10(1)(i) applies retroactively to convictions that were imposed 
before its enactment.21 
2. Flaws with New York’s Vacatur Statute 
Despite the statute’s benevolent goals and provisions—and its role as 
an important step in the movement to empower trafficking survivors22—its 
utilization as a method of relief for trafficking victims has been marginal in 
relation to the number of people who are eligible for relief.23 One 
                                                                                                     
 18. Act of Aug. 13, 2010, ch. 332, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1083 (McKinney). 
 19. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2014). 
 20. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1463 (citing Letter from Richard N. Gottfried, 
Chair, N.Y. Assembly Comm. on Health, to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to the Governor (July 
20, 2010)). 
 21. See id. (citing Legislative Memorandum Relating to Ch. 332, 2010 N.Y. Sess. 
Laws, at 1906–07).  
 22. PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 26. 
 23. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1483–84 (noting that as of March 2014, only thirty-
eight sex trafficking victims in New York had successfully utilized section 440.10(1)(i) to 
vacate prior convictions); see also Kate Mogulescu, The Public Defender as Anti-Trafficking 
Advocate, an Unlikely Role: How Current New York City Arrest and Prosecution Policies 
Systematically Criminalize Victims of Sex Trafficking, 15 CUNY L. REV. 471, 477–78 
(2012) (noting that in 2011, more than 2800 people were arrested and prosecuted in New 
York City for engaging in prostitution-related activity and that the overwhelming majority of 
those arrested meet all of the legal criteria for sex trafficking under either New York or 
federal law). The number of cases in which convictions have been vacated in other states is 
even smaller. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1484 (noting only two people in Illinois who 
had successfully vacated their trafficking-related convictions since the enactment of Illinois’ 
vacatur statute in 2011 and only one person in Maryland). Barnard added that with respect to 
the other states with vacatur provisions for trafficking victims, she found “no evidence that 
anyone [in those states] has ever vacated a trafficking-related conviction.” Id. 
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explanation for the statute’s limited application is that it imposes certain 
procedural hurdles, making it impractical or otherwise difficult for 
trafficking victims to utilize as a method for relief. 
For example, Section 440.10(1)(i) has a due-diligence requirement, 
which provides that a victim’s motion must be filed in a timely fashion.24 
Ordinarily, when a defendant moves to vacate a criminal conviction, she 
argues that she did not, as a factual matter, commit the offense for which 
she was convicted.25 The primary reason behind imposing due-diligence 
requirements for vacatur provisions is to balance justice with both the 
integrity of the trial process and the finality of the jury’s judgment26—i.e., 
after a certain amount of time, we have to accept factual findings as fact to 
avoid endless challenges that would otherwise excessively clog the criminal 
justice system. This reason, however, does not justify a due-diligence 
requirement for the sex trafficking vacatur statute to the same extent as it 
does, say, for the newly discovered evidence vacatur statute. The former 
does not involve a factual challenge as to whether or not the defendant 
actually committed the offense at issue; instead, a sex trafficking victim 
who brings a motion to vacate does so on the grounds that she is not 
culpable for the conduct that formed the basis of the offense at issue.27 
Thus, motions to vacate sex trafficking victims’ convictions do not threaten 
                                                                                                     
 24. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1)(b)(ii) (2012) (providing that a motion to vacate 
filed under 440.10 shall be denied if filed more than five years after the conviction). This is 
the case unless the party filing the motion shows: 
(A) that he or she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently and that some 
extraordinary circumstance prevented the timely filing of the motion; (B) that 
the facts upon which the motion is predicated were unknown to the defendant or 
his or her attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 
diligence prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations; or (C) considering 
all circumstances of the case including but not limited to evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt, the impact of granting or denying such motion upon public 
confidence in the criminal justice system, or upon the safety or welfare of the 
community, and the defendant’s diligence in seeking to obtain the requested 
property or related relief, the interests of justice would be served by considering 
the motion. 
Id.  
 25. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1486 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) 
(allowing a motion to vacate if newly discovered evidence that was unavailable at trial “is of 
such character as to create a probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the 
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant”)). 
 26. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1486 (explaining the delicate balance between 
justice and integrity in trial procedure). 
 27. See id. (explaining that vacatur is based on culpability rather than whether or not 
the law was broken). 
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the criminal justice system with the possibility of endless factual 
challenges, and as a result, their due-diligence requirements unnecessarily 
infringe on trafficking victims’ abilities to obtain relief.28 
Additionally, New York’s sex trafficking vacatur statute provides sex 
trafficking victims with little guidance as to what types of evidence are 
acceptable ways of proving that they were, in fact, sex trafficking victims.29 
“Without clear standards to guide judges on the evidence probative in 
trafficking vacatur cases, there is a danger that judges will use improper 
means to evaluate credibility, and that those credibility determinations 
would be difficult to overturn upon [appellate] review.”30 
Another critique of the statute claim that its limitation to arrests for 
prostitution and related offenses denies relief to individuals who are forced 
by their traffickers to commit other, non-prostitution-related offenses. For 
example, sex traffickers often maintain control over their victims by 
making them dependent on illegal drugs and sometimes force them to 
purchase the illegal drugs.31 Under New York’s vacatur statute, the 
criticism follows, a trafficking victim who purchases illegal drugs as a 
result of being trafficked would have no relief for any arrests or convictions 
that stem from the illegal drug transaction. Considering that trafficking 
victims in such scenarios commit illegal acts at the coercive direction of 
their traffickers, it is illogical—keeping in mind the justification behind the 
vacatur statutes—to preclude these victims from relief of punishment for 
the acts. 
A critique of vacatur statutes, generally, is that most of them 
condition—either explicitly32 or implicitly33—the ability to obtain relief on 
                                                                                                     
 28. See generally PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 35 (noting that requiring 
trafficking victims to file their vacatur motions within a certain period of time ignores the 
fact that after a victim has escaped a trafficking situation, it may be some time before she is 
ready to seek services or pursue relief). 
 29. Barnard, supra note 17, at 1488–89; see also § 440.10(1)(i)(ii) (providing that 
“official documentation of the defendant’s status as a victim of sex trafficking . . . shall 
create a presumption that the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of having 
been a victim of sex trafficking.”); see also PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 34 (“Although 
vacatur statutes do not require that survivors present corroborating evidence to prove they 
were trafficking victims, there is a danger that prosecutors and courts may implicitly require 
corroborating evidence.”). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.0583(6)(a) (2015), and MD. CODE. 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. §8-302(b)(4) (West 2015) (showing that other states’ statutes similarly 
provide sex trafficking victims with little guidance). 
 30. Barnard, supra note 17, at 1490. 
 31. See id. at 1476. 
 32. See, e.g., generally, HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1209.6(2)(e) (2015); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-302(b)(2); WASH REV. CODE § 9.96.060(3)(a)–(c) (2015). 
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either a victim’s cooperation with law enforcement, prosecutor approval, or 
the lack of other criminal charges or convictions.34 Many trafficking victims 
have strong and legitimate reasons for not wanting to cooperate with law 
enforcement;35 and thus, conditioning relief on victim cooperation 
frequently undermines vacatur statutes’ goals of furthering the fundamental 
principles of justice.36 
Given the ineffectiveness of trafficking-related vacatur statutes, 
legislators in states like New York—and in states that do not provide 
trafficking victims with any relief for crimes that they committed as a result 
of having been trafficked, for that matter—should ask themselves why they 
do not provide these victims with relief before a conviction in the form of 
an affirmative defense. To answer this question, it is helpful to understand 
how affirmative defenses work and why they exist. The following Part 
analyzes the justifications for affirmative defenses, generally, and discusses 
affirmative defenses in contexts outside of sex trafficking. 
III. Discussion of Affirmative Defenses in Other Contexts 
This Part provides useful background on affirmative defenses, 
generally, in the criminal law context. It then discusses the affirmative 
defense of duress and its underlying justification. 
A. Affirmative Defenses, Generally 
The term defense in the criminal law context refers to identifiable 
conditions or circumstances that may prevent conviction for an offense.37 
There are three types of “general” defenses that apply to offenses despite 
the existence of all required elements of an offense and independently of 
                                                                                                     
 33. See, e.g., PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 34 (noting that although New York’s 
vacatur statute does not require victims to cooperate with law enforcement, “New York 
District Attorneys’ offices often implicitly require such cooperation before they will consent 
to motions to vacate”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. (explaining that trafficking victims’ reasons for declining to cooperate in 
investigations stems from fear and mistrust of law enforcement—resulting from prior 
experiences with the police and from the fact that traffickers instill a fear of law enforcement 
into their victims to prevent them from seeking help—and fear that their traffickers might 
seek retribution against them or their families). 
 36. Id. at 35. 
 37. PAUL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21 (2014). 
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the criminalization decision of a particular offense: (1) justifications, 
(2) excuses, and (3) nonexculpatory defenses.38  
The conduct of a justified actor is not culpable because its 
benefits outweigh the harm or evil of the offense itself; an 
excused actor admits the harm or evil but nonetheless claims an 
absence of personal culpability; and an actor exempt under a 
nonexculpatory defense admits the harm or evil and his 
culpability but relies upon an important public policy interest, 
apart from blamelessness, that is furthered by foregoing the 
defendant’s conviction.39 
Particularly relevant to the context of trafficking victims who commit 
crimes at the direction of their traffickers is the “excuse” defense, because 
such a defense is deemed appropriate based on the defendant’s lack of 
responsibility. 
In criminal law, an excuse defense generally has the following internal 
structure: a “disability causing an excusing condition.”40 A disability is a 
condition with observable manifestations that are separate from the conduct 
constituting the offense and “may be permanent (subnormality) or 
temporary (intoxication), internal (insanity) or external (duress).”41 Having 
the disability at the time of the offense is not enough, as the disability is not 
the underlying reason for excusing the actor; instead, an actor’s disability 
must have caused a particular result.42 Society is generally willing to excuse 
an actor “when the actor perceives the conduct accurately and fully, 
understands its physical consequences, and knows it wrongfulness or 
criminality, but lacks the ability to control his conduct . . . to such an extent 
that it is not proper to hold him accountable for it.”43 Thus, the rationale 
underlying the establishment of an excuse defense for human trafficking 
victims is that the victims lack personal culpability for crimes that their 
traffickers cause them to commit. 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 25. 
 41. Id.; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.1 (2d ed. 2014). 
 42. ROBINSON, supra note 37, at § 25. 
 43. Id. 
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B. Duress 
An affirmative defense for trafficking victims would be similar to the 
defense of duress, though duress is defined narrowly and thus would not 
encompass a substantial amount of crimes that trafficking victims commit 
at the direction of their traffickers. The defense of duress in the criminal 
law context is generally defined as the following: 
A person’s unlawful threat (1) which causes the defendant 
reasonably to believe that the only way to avoid imminent death 
or serious bodily injury to himself or to another is to engage in 
conduct which violates the literal terms of the criminal law, and 
(2) which causes the defendant to engage in that conduct, gives 
the defendant the defense of duress (sometimes called compulsion 
or coercion) to the crime in question unless that crime consists of 
intentionally killing an innocent third person.44 
Given the manner in which sex traffickers often compel their victims to 
break the law—for example, by “grooming” victims through extensive 
psychological torment; physical, verbal, and sexual abuse; facilitating 
dependency on drugs; brainwashing; document confiscation; and 
techniques used to erase the victim’s former identity, like renaming the 
victim or burning personal items45—the duress defense falls short for the 
many sex trafficking victims who do not face imminent death or serious 
bodily injury. Perhaps more importantly, duress falls short for the many sex 
trafficking victims who would not be able to prove in court that their 
criminal behavior was the result of some imminent threat of death or 
serious bodily injury. In fact, instead of using threats of imminent physical 
violence to compel their victims to prostitute themselves, sex traffickers 
oftentimes threaten to call the police and have their victims arrested if they 
                                                                                                     
 44. LAFAVE, supra note 41, at § 9.7. “The rationale of the defense of duress is that the 
defendant ought to be excused when he ‘is a victim of a threat that a person of reasonable 
moral strength could not fairly be expected to resist . . . .” (quoting Joshua Dressler, Exegesis 
of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1331, 1350 (1989)). 
 45. See PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 9 (“Physical violence can be used to instill 
submission, to punish victims if they challenge their traffickers’ authority, and as a reminder 
that the victim is entirely at the whims of the trafficker.”); see Barnard, supra note 17, at 
1469 (“Slowly, the trafficker will ‘groom’ his victim through a combination of physical and 
emotional abuse.”); see also Marihug Cedeño, Pimps, Johns, and Juvenile Prostitutes: Is 
New York Doing Enough to Combat the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children?, 22 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 160 (2012) (describing grooming as a “brutal process [that] 
involves breaking the girls down in order to gain complete control over their identity or 
individuality”). 
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do not submit to the trafficker’s demands46—a threat that relies on the fact 
that these victims face criminal liability and that, presumably, would not be 
possible if these victims were excused from such criminal behavior via an 
affirmative defense. 
Considering the rationale for excuse defenses like duress—that is, lack 
of personal culpability—as well as the fact that many trafficking victims 
who commit incidental crimes lack personal culpability, it seems intuitive 
that trafficking victims should be excused from criminal liability even when 
they do not directly face death or some imminent, physical injury. This 
position is supported by the fact that states are increasingly enacting vacatur 
and affirmative defense statutes for trafficking victims. So, if society is 
beginning to acknowledge that trafficking victims do not deserve criminal 
convictions for certain crimes, why are more states not taking remedial 
action through the use of affirmative defense statutes? The following Parts 
consider answers to this question and argue that more states should consider 
adopting their own affirmative defense statutes for trafficking victims. 
IV. The Establishment of an Affirmative Defense for Victims of 
Human Trafficking 
This Part considers arguments for and against the creation of an 
affirmative defense at the state level for victims of human trafficking. In 
doing so, it compares the effectiveness of an affirmative defense to that of 
vacatur statutes. 
A. Arguments in Favor of an Affirmative Defense 
First, creating an affirmative defense for trafficking victims who 
commit incidental crimes—specifically, prostitution—as a result of being 
trafficked would allow victims to avoid convictions for crimes that they are 
not culpable of committing. Like a person who is excused for committing a 
crime under duress, a human trafficking victim who commits a criminal 
offense as a result of being trafficked oftentimes is subject to the complete 
                                                                                                     
 46. See generally PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 9; see also Mogulescu, supra note 
23, at 483 (“Traffickers use victims’ criminal histories as grounds for bringing proceedings 
against them in Family Court, and as a consistent threat for clients who are undocumented 
immigrants . . . . Traffickers take advantage of their victims’ isolation, and deceive them into 
thinking that they lack any legal protections and that reporting will result in arrest, 
deportation, and even abuse by authorities.”). 
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volition of the trafficker. For example, when a sex trafficking victim 
prostitutes herself at the direction of her pimp, she is acting under her pimp’s 
orders, subject to her pimp’s physical and/or psychological torment, and for 
her pimp’s financial gain. Even if the sex trafficking victim in this scenario 
does not qualify for a duress defense—say, because she did not face an 
imminent threat of physical injury—she seems just as deserving of an excuse 
for her criminal act as someone who does qualify for a duress defense. From 
a sheer culpability standpoint, society should allocate all of the blame to the 
trafficker and none to the victim. 
Second, an affirmative defense offers a procedural advantage that is not 
available under some states’ current post-conviction remedial approaches—
namely, it is easier to prove that someone is a trafficking victim early in the 
process as opposed to months or years later.47 A human trafficking victim 
would certainly be able to furnish more evidence of her status as a trafficked 
person soon after an arrest than if she had to prove this fact months or years 
later as she would likely have to do for a motion to vacate.48  
During the time it takes to convict the trafficking victim and then file a 
motion to vacate, her trafficker could relocate or cover up any evidence that 
the victim would need to prove that she was a trafficking victim at the time of 
the offense. Moving this burden of proof earlier in the process (i.e., 
establishing an affirmative defense) simply allows for less manipulation—
natural or artificial—of crucial evidence.49 
Third, an affirmative defense for sex trafficking victims would give 
those victims an alternative that does not brand them as criminals, allowing 
them to focus solely on rehabilitation. In holding people criminally 
accountable for certain acts, the criminal justice system has several end goals, 
only one of which is rehabilitating the defendant.50 An affirmative defense 
would allow victims to bypass the criminal justice system, thus allowing 
them to utilize—and allowing government and non-governmental actors to 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1500 (suggesting that by letting victims of 
trafficking present a defense earlier in the legal process, it would be easier to prove and may 
also encourage the victims to leave their traffickers earlier). 
 48. See id. (noting that it makes more sense from an evidentiary perspective to be able 
to raise the defense sooner). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) (stating that the criminal justice 
system operates primarily for the benefit of society, which includes both punishing the 
offender and rehabilitating him); see also Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1421, 1444 (2004) (“[P]hilosophers of punishment traditionally offer four justifications for 
punishment: deterrence of future wrongful actions by either the offender or the general 
population, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.”). 
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provide—options that focus solely on rehabilitation and that are entirely 
separate from the penal goals of the criminal justice system. 
Fourth, an affirmative defense for sex trafficking victims would 
encourage such victims to seek help and to cooperate with law enforcement. 
With an available affirmative defense, victims who would otherwise fear 
criminal prosecution would be more likely to view law enforcement—and the 
government, more generally—as avenues of solace, as opposed to 
adversaries. This would help align trafficking victims with the government 
and would allow them to distance victims from their traffickers, which is 
particularly important because traffickers oftentimes make this very difficult 
by establishing systematic and psychological ties of dependence and loyalty 
with their victims.51 
B. Addressing the Moral Hazard Counterargument 
The first counterargument to a trafficking victim affirmative defense 
that comes to mind is the moral hazard52 argument. Excusing trafficking 
victims of their crimes, the argument follows, would make them more likely 
to commit crimes or, depending on how you view the issue, it would make 
them less likely to avoid committing crimes. This argument assumes that 
trafficking victims are rational, autonomous decision-makers who consider 
how their conduct might benefit or harm them before acting. However, most 
human trafficking victims are not autonomous decision-makers but, rather, 
act solely based on the decisions that their traffickers make for them.53 In 
fact, the primary justification for establishing a trafficking victim affirmative 
                                                                                                     
 51. See PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 9–10 (telling the story of a trafficked sex 
worker who did not want to cooperate with law enforcement because she both loved her 
pimp and was afraid of him); Serita, supra note 5, at 643 (noting that the complicated 
relationship between pimp and prostitute—oftentimes involving a sexual relationship and 
shared children between the two parties—is similar to that of domestic batterer and intimate 
partner, and explaining that it is usually difficult for prostitutes to leave their pimps because 
“they ‘often express feelings of love and admiration for the pimp, have their freedom and 
finances controlled, and may feel they somehow deserve the violence they are dealt’” 
(quoting Celia Williamson & Terry Cluse-Tolar, Pimp-Controlled Prostitution: Still an 
Integral Part of Street Life, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1074, 1089 (2002))). 
 52. See Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 
1463 n.257 (2009) (defining moral hazard as the phenomenon by which injury and activity 
rates increase as a response to a decrease in the expected costs of injury). 
 53. See Cedeño, supra note 45, at 160 (“After gaining their trust and affection, pimps 
begin to ‘groom’ or ‘season’ the girls . . . [which] involves breaking the girls down in order 
to gain complete control over their identity or individuality.”). 
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defense is that the victims lack culpability because they effectively have no 
say in their conduct. As such, it is unlikely that an affirmative defense would 
motivate trafficking victims to act a certain way at all, much less break the 
law. 
V. States’ Current Trafficking Victim Affirmative Defense Statutes 
This Part describes the current state of the law regarding states’ 
trafficking victim affirmative defense statutes and considers the different 
approaches that states have adopted in their respective efforts to provide 
trafficking victims with affirmative defenses. In doing so, it discusses 
trafficking victim affirmative defense statutes that: (1) are limited to duress or 
duress-like situations, (2) are limited to prostitution and related offenses; and 
(3) extend beyond prostitution offenses and apply to other incidental crimes. 
A. Current State of the Law Regarding States’ Trafficking Victim Affirmative 
Defense Statutes 
Eighteen states—Alabama,54 Arizona,55 Arkansas,56 Connecticut,57 
Delaware,58 Georgia,59 Kansas,60 
                                                                                                     
 54. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (2015) (providing victims of human trafficking an 
affirmative defense to prosecution for prostitution or sexually explicit performances). 
 55. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3214(D) (2015) (providing an affirmative defense 
to prosecutions under this section if a defendant commits the acts constituting prostitution as 
a direct result of being a victim of sex trafficking). 
 56. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-70-102(c)–103(c) (West 2015) (providing an 
affirmative defense to prosecutions if a person engaged in an act of prostitution as a result of 
being a victim of human trafficking). 
 57. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(b) (2015) (providing immunity for minors under 
the age of sixteen with respect to prosecution for prostitution, giving all trafficking victims 
an affirmative defense to prosecution for prostitution, and stating that for prostitution 
prosecutions involving minors aged sixteen and seventeen, there is “a presumption that the 
actor was a victim of conduct by another person that constitutes” a violation of the state or 
federal anti-trafficking laws). 
 58. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 787(h) (2015) (establishing that patronizing a 
victim of sexual servitude is a Class D felony, or a Class C felony if the victim is a minor). 
 59. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6(b)–(c) (West 2015) (providing an affirmative defense 
to prosecutions under this section if a defendant commits the acts constituting prostitution as 
a direct result of being a victim of sex trafficking). 
 60. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6419(c) (2015) (providing an affirmative defense to 
prosecutions if a person engaged in an act of prostitution as a result of being a victim of 
trafficking of persons). 
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Kentucky,61 Louisiana,62 Nebraska,63 New Hampshire,64 New Jersey,65 
Oklahoma,66 South Dakota,67 Vermont,68 Washington,69 Wisconsin,70 and 
Wyoming71—currently provide affirmative defenses for human trafficking 
victims who commit certain criminal acts as a result of being trafficked. 
Some of these statutes are limited to prostitution and related offenses, and 
others cover a wider range of criminal conduct. In every other state, 
however, human trafficking victims who are arrested for criminal offenses 
                                                                                                     
 61. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170 (West 2015) (establishing that a person 
charged under this chapter, or charged with an offense that is not a violent crime, may assert 
being a victim of human trafficking as an affirmative defense to the charge). 
 62. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.46.2(F)(1) (2014) (providing an affirmative defense 
to prosecutions under this section if a defendant commits the acts constituting prostitution as 
a direct result of being a victim of sex trafficking). 
 63. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-801(3) (2014) (providing an affirmative defense to 
prosecutions under this section for persons who were trafficking victims). 
 64. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (2015) (limiting the applicability of the 
affirmative defense to prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution charges). 
 65. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2015) (providing an affirmative defense 
to prosecution for a violation of this section if, during the time of the alleged commission of 
the offense, the defendant was a victim of human trafficking or compelled by another to 
engage in sexual activity, regardless of the defendant’s age). 
 66. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West 2015) (providing an affirmative 
defense to prosecution for a criminal offense if, during the time of the alleged commission of 
the offense, the defendant was a victim of human trafficking). 
 67. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-23-1.2 (2014) (providing an affirmative defense to a 
charge of prostitution if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant is a victim of human trafficking or that the defendant committed the act only 
under compulsion by another person who, by implicit or explicit threat, created a reasonable 
apprehension in the mind of the defendant that if the defendant did not commit the act, the 
person would inflict bodily harm upon the defendant). 
 68. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2652(c) (West 2015) (providing that a person who is 
a victim of sex trafficking shall not be found in violation of or be the subject of a 
delinquency petition (lewdness and prostitution) or (obscenity) of this title for any conduct 
committed as a victim of sex trafficking). 
 69. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.040 (2015) (providing that trafficking in persons 
shall create a presumption that the person’s participation in prostitution was a result of 
having been a victim of trafficking). 
 70. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West 2015) (providing victims human 
trafficking or child trafficking with an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a 
direct result of the violation of human trafficking or child trafficking without regard to 
whether anyone was prosecuted or convicted for the violation of human trafficking or child 
trafficking). 
 71. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a) (West 2015) (stating that a “victim of human 
trafficking is not criminally liable for any commercial sex act or other criminal acts as a 
direct result of, or incident to, being a victim of human trafficking”). 
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that they commit as a result of being trafficked can only claim successful 
affirmative defenses if they establish duress (or something similar).72 
1. Limiting the Affirmative Defense to Duress or Duress-Like Situations 
Five states—Iowa,73 Massachusetts,74 Minnesota,75 Pennsylvania,76 
and South Carolina77—provide affirmative defenses to trafficking victims 
who commit certain criminal acts under duress or duress-like situations. 
Although these five states formally provide trafficking victims with 
codified affirmative defenses, the extent of their coverage is essentially the 
same as that of a duress defense—the latter of which is already available to 
any person, victim or not. As such, this Article distinguishes these five 
states from the eighteen states listed in the preceding paragraph and equates 
the former to states that do not designate any type of affirmative defense for 
trafficking victims.78  
                                                                                                     
 72. See LAFAVE, supra note 41, at § 9.7 (noting that “a great majority of the modern 
criminal codes provide for a duress defense[,]” and that a common law duress defense is 
available in the absence of a statutory defense). 
 73. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West 2015) (limiting the affirmative defense to 
situations in which the trafficking victim “committed the violation under compulsion by 
another’s threat of serious injury, provided that the defendant reasonably believed that such 
injury was imminent”). 
 74. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 57 (West 2015) (limiting the affirmative 
defense to situations in which the trafficking victim committed the violation “under duress 
or [was] coerced into committing the offenses”). 
 75. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2015) (limiting the affirmative defense 
to situations in which the trafficking victim “committed the act only under compulsion by 
another who . . . created a reasonable apprehension in the . . . defendant that if the defendant 
did not commit the act, the person would inflict bodily harm upon the defendant”). 
 76. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3019(b) (2014) (limiting the affirmative defense to 
situations in which a person charged with prostitution or related offenses committed the 
act(s) “because he was compelled to do so by coercion or the use of or a threat to use 
unlawful force against his person or the person of another”). 
 77. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2020(J) (2015) (limiting the affirmative defense to 
situations in which the trafficking victim committed the violation “under duress or [was] 
coerced into committing the offenses”). 
 78. The other states that do not designate any type of affirmative defense to trafficking 
victims are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and West Virginia. Westlaw, Lexis, and Google searches for human trafficking 
victim affirmative defenses returned no results for the states listed in the preceding sentence. 
Searches were run for each state individually with the terms “human traffic! affirmative 
defense!” in each database. 
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2. Limiting the Affirmative Defense to Prostitution and Related Offenses 
A majority of the states that provide affirmative defenses for human 
trafficking victims limit their coverage to prostitution and related offenses.79 
Delaware’s affirmative defense statute, for example, only applies to 
trafficking victims who are charged with prostitution or loitering.80 Georgia’s 
                                                                                                     
 79. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (2015) (stating explicitly that the affirmative 
defense applies to those involved “[i]n a prosecution for prostitution, or a sexually explicit 
performance defined in this article, of a human trafficking victim for the victim’s illegal acts 
engaged in or performed as a result of labor servitude or sexual servitude”); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-3214(D) (2015) (indicating that in a prosecution regarding prostitution “[i]t 
is an affirmative defense . . . that the defendant committed the acts constituting prostitution 
as a direct result of being a victim of sex trafficking); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-70-102(c)–
103(c) (West 2015) (finding “an affirmative defense” for both prostitution and sexual 
solicitation charges “as a result of being a victim of trafficking”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
82(b) (2015) (stating that “[i]n any prosecution for an offense under this section, it shall be 
an affirmative defense that the actor was a victim of conduct by another person”); DEL. 
CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 787(h) (2015) (indicating that “[a]n individual charged with 
prostitution or loitering committed as a direct result of being a victim of human trafficking 
may assert as an affirmative defense that the individual is a victim of human trafficking”); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6(b)–(c) (West 2015) (indicating that a defense under this provision 
constitutes an affirmative defense, and one is not guilty of a “sexual crime if [the] 
accused . . . was . . . [a]cting under coercion or deception while the accused was being 
trafficked for sexual servitude”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6419(c) (2015) (finding that it is “an 
affirmative defense to any prosecution under this section that the defendant committed the 
violation of this section because such defendant was subject to human trafficking or 
aggravated human trafficking”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2(F)(1) (2014) (stating that 
“[a] victim of trafficking . . . shall have an affirmative defense to prosecution for any of the 
following[:] . . . prostitution, prostitution by massage, massage (sexual conduct prohibited), 
crime against nature, [and] crime against nature by solicitation”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
801.01(3) (2015) (indicating that “[i]t is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this 
section that such person was a trafficking victim”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) 
(2015) (indicating that it is an affirmative defense in the event an individual is charged under 
“subparagraph l(a) that the defendant engaged in the conduct because he or she was the 
victim of trafficking in persons”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2015) (stating that “it 
is an affirmative defense to prosecution of . . . [prostitution and related offenses] during the 
time of the alleged commission of the offense, [if] the defendant was a victim of human 
trafficking . . . or [was] compelled by another to engage in sexual activity”); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-23-1.2 (2014) (providing that human trafficking is “an affirmative defense to a 
charge of prostitution if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant is a victim of human trafficking . . . or that the defendant committed the act only 
under compulsion by another ”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2652(c) (West 2015) (indicating 
that a victim of sex trafficking “shall not be found in violation of or be the subject of a 
delinquency petition [for lewdness and prostitution and obscenity],” and that an individual 
may raise this as an affirmative defense for delinquency petitions in violation of other 
chapters); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.040 (2015) (regarding prosecutions for prostitution 
charges “it is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense as a result of being 
a victim of trafficking”). 
 80. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 787(h) (indicating that “[a]n individual 
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statute, on the other hand, has a slightly broader reach and excuses trafficking 
victims who are charged with “sexual crimes.”81 Louisiana’s statute excuses 
trafficking victims who are charged with prostitution, prostitution by 
massage, crime against nature, or crime against nature by solicitation.82 
In addition to their substantive limitations, these statutes generally 
contain causation requirements that limit their availability to crimes that are 
committed as direct results of being trafficked.83 In other words, they would 
not excuse a sex trafficking victim who commits one of the enumerated 
offenses but who does so on her own time, so to speak. For example, consider 
a sex trafficking victim who is prostituting herself in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
at the direction of her pimp (i.e., she is committing the crime of prostitution 
as a direct result of being trafficked). If she flees her trafficker, relocates to 
New Orleans, and prostitutes herself on her own (i.e., without a pimp); then 
she would not be entitled to relief under statute’s with causation 
requirements, even though she was previously a sex trafficking victim. 
3. Extending the Affirmative Defense to Non-Prostitution-Related Offenses 
There are currently four states—Kentucky,84 Oklahoma,85 Wisconsin,86 
and Wyoming87—that provide an affirmative defense for human trafficking 
                                                                                                     
charged with prostitution or loitering committed as a direct result of being a victim of human 
trafficking may assert as an affirmative defense”). 
 81. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6(a)(3) (defining sexual crime as “prostitution, 
sodomy, solicitation of sodomy, or masturbation”). 
 82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2(F)(1)(a)–(e). 
 83. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-102(c) (“It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution that the person engaged in an act of prostitution as a result of being a victim of 
trafficking of persons.” (emphasis added)); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 787(h) (“An 
individual charged with prostitution or loitering committed as a direct result of being a 
victim of human trafficking may assert as an affirmative defense that the individual is a 
victim of human trafficking.” (emphasis added)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2(F)(1) (“A 
victim of trafficking . . . shall have an affirmative defense to prosecution for any of the 
following offenses which were committed as a direct result of being trafficked.” (emphasis 
added)); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(b) (providing an affirmative defense in any 
prosecution for prostitution if the actor was a victim of human trafficking and not limiting 
coverage to crimes that are committed as a direct result of being trafficked). 
 84. Infra notes 88, 94 and accompanying text; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170 (West 
2015). 
 85. Infra notes 89, 93 and accompanying text; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) 
(West 2015). 
 86. Infra note 90 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West 2015). 
 87. Infra note 91 and accompanying text; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a) (West 2015). 
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victims who commit non-prostitution-related offenses. Kentucky’s statute 
provides that “[a] person charged [with prostitution], or charged with an 
offense which is not a violent crime . . . may assert being a victim of human 
trafficking as an affirmative defense to the charge.”88 Oklahoma’s statute 
provides “an affirmative defense to prosecution for a criminal offense that, 
during the time of the alleged commission of the offense, the defendant was 
a victim of human trafficking.”89 Wisconsin’s statute provides an 
affirmative defense to a human trafficking victim “for any offense 
committed as a direct result of [being trafficked] without regard to whether 
anyone was prosecuted or convicted” for the human trafficking violation.90 
Finally, Wyoming’s statute provides that “[a] victim of human trafficking is 
not criminally liable for any commercial sex act or other criminal acts 
committed as a direct result of, or incident to, being a victim of human 
trafficking . . . .”91  
Under a plain reading of Wisconsin’s and Wyoming’s statutes, a 
human trafficking victim in either of those states can assert an affirmative 
defense for any offense, so long as the offense is committed as a direct 
result of being trafficked.92 Oklahoma’s statute goes even further and 
applies to any offense that a human trafficking victim commits while she is 
a victim, regardless of whether the offense is committed as a direct result of 
being trafficked.93 Of these statutes, Kentucky’s has the narrowest scope, as 
it only applies to prostitution and non-violent crimes.94 
                                                                                                     
 88. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170; see also id. § 17.165(3) (defining “violent crime” 
as “a capital offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the death of the victim, or 
rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree of the victim or serious physical injury 
to a victim”). 
 89. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D). 
 90. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m). 
 91. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a). 
 92. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a) (noting the 
reach of the affirmative defense, extending to offenses directly resulting from conduct of an 
individual that is a victim of human trafficking). 
 93. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West 2015). This plain-meaning interpretation 
of Oklahoma’s trafficking victim affirmative defense statute is based on the statute’s general 
applicability to “prosecution for a criminal offense” and its omission of a causation 
requirement. 
 94. Though it is worth noting that, like Oklahoma’s statute, Kentucky’s trafficking 
victim affirmative defense statute does not contain a causal provision; and presumably, it 
would excuse a trafficking victim from prosecution for prostitution or a non-violent crime, 
regardless of whether the offense is committed as a direct result of being trafficked. 
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VI. Proposed State Legislative Model for the Adoption of a Trafficking 
Victim Affirmative Defense 
This Part considers what legislative model states should adopt to 
adequately further the goals of assisting human trafficking victims while 
maintaining their respective interests in combating human trafficking and 
other crimes. In doing so, it demonstrates why states should create general 
trafficking victim affirmative defenses, as opposed to limiting their 
respective trafficking victim affirmative defenses to prostitution and related 
offenses. Finally, it discusses why state legislatures should adopt multi-
faceted, collaborative approaches that include trafficking victim affirmative 
defenses as well as other victim-oriented solutions. 
A. Why States Should Not Limit Their Affirmative Defenses to Prostitution 
and Related Offenses 
A majority of the states with trafficking victim affirmative defense 
statutes have limited the substantive reach of those statutes to excuse 
charges for prostitution and related offenses.95 As discussed earlier in this 
Article, trafficking victims are frequently compelled to commit non-
prostitution-related crimes96 or are arrested for “lesser” offenses such as 
vagrancy, trespass, or disorderly conduct.97 Despite committing such 
offenses, however, these trafficking victims (1) lack culpability to the same 
extent as those who are entitled to relief from committing prostitution-
related crimes, and (2) need non-criminal outlets to have any viable chance 
of rehabilitation and/or rescue from their traffickers. Thus, by limiting their 
affirmative defenses to prostitution-related offenses, states do not 
adequately provide relief to trafficking victims who deserve and need it just 
as much as those who are entitled to relief.98 As the next subpart 
demonstrates, states that have not already done so should create trafficking 
                                                                                                     
 95. See generally supra Part V.A.2. 
 96. See, e.g., PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 (“Due to risks of violence and rape 
from clients, individuals trafficked into the sex trade may also be compelled to carry a 
weapon for self-defense.”). 
 97. Id. at 15. 
 98. Cf. People v. L.G., 972 N.Y.S.2d 418, 425–28 (Crim. Ct. 2013) (finding that a 
trafficking victim who was convicted for criminal weapons possession was entitled to 
vacatur relief, even though New York’s vacatur statute was limited to prostitution-related 
offenses, on the grounds that the conviction was clearly the result of her having been 
trafficked, thus allowing the criminal charge to be considered a prostitution-related offense). 
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victim affirmative defense statutes that extend to non-prostitution-related 
offenses; but in doing so, they should not extend the coverage of those 
statutes too broadly, lest they excessively diminish their respective interests 
in combating crime. 
B. Why States Should Extend Their Affirmative Defenses to Incidental  
(Non-Prostitution-Related) Offenses 
As mentioned in the previous subpart, human trafficking victims 
frequently commit non-prostitution-related offenses at the direction of their 
respective traffickers (e.g., vagrancy, trespass, disorderly conduct, crimes 
against nature, larceny, drug offenses, and immigration offenses),99 and as a 
result, they need the option to assert more generalized affirmative defenses. 
Four states recognized this problem and responded by enacting their own 
non-prostitution-related affirmative defense statutes.100 However, by 
extending the defense to any crime,101 three of these states provide too 
much relief under their respective statutes.  
While ensuring that trafficking victims are entitled to an adequate 
amount of relief should be an important goal for every state legislature, 
states must also consider their general interests in combating crime—
especially crimes involving violence. In the three states that extend their 
affirmative defenses to include any crime—Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming—a trafficking victim could conceivably be excused of murdering 
another person, so long as the trafficking victim satisfies the other statutory 
criteria.102 This hypothetical, in which a trafficking victim is excused of 
murder, seems especially absurd under the Oklahoma statute. Oklahoma’s 
statute does not contain a causation requirement, so a trafficking victim 
could conceivably be excused of murdering another person, regardless of 
                                                                                                     
 99. See, e.g., PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 14, at 15–16 (discussing common instances 
of criminal conduct carried out by human trafficking victims as incidents of having been 
trafficked). 
 100. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170 (West 2015) (allowing a person to assert 
being a victim of human trafficking as an affirmative defense to certain non-prostitution-
related charges); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West 2015) (same); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West 2015) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a) (West 2015) 
(same). 
 101. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-2-708(a). 
 102. See supra Part V.A.3 (discussing the plain-meaning interpretation of Oklahoma’s, 
Wisconsin’s, and Wyoming’s affirmative defense statutes). 
200 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 177 (2016) 
whether the homicide was committed as a result of being trafficked. Taking 
the statute to its logical extreme, if a sex trafficking victim in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma were to go into a convenience store to commit an armed robbery, 
only to kill the store clerk afterward to cover her tracks, then that trafficking 
victim could argue that she is entitled to a defense under Oklahoma’s 
trafficking victim affirmative defense statute simply because she was, in 
fact, a trafficking victim during the commission of the offense. This 
interpretation of the statute seemingly gives trafficking victims carte 
blanche to break the law however they want, which is particularly 
frightening because the vast majority of trafficking victims are essentially 
puppets who do whatever their masters (i.e., their traffickers) command. 
On the other hand, under Kentucky’s approach—which is limited to 
non-violent crimes103—traffickers would not able to use their trafficking 
victims as proxies to commit violent, ancillary crimes without consequence. 
In this vein, states would be able to maintain their interests in preventing 
violent crime and, relatedly, in maintaining a safe and orderly society. The 
normative concern that society ought to weigh the prevention of violent 
crime more heavily than the vindication of non-culpable actors is supported 
by the fact that even duress generally does not excuse murder.104 It is 
important to note, however, that Kentucky’s statute lacks a causation 
requirement and extends the defense to cover crimes that trafficking victims 
commit without any influence from their traffickers. An ideal approach 
would contain a causation requirement to limit the defense to only those 
crimes for which trafficking victims truly lack personal culpability. Under 
this modified Kentucky approach, trafficking victims would be entitled to 
relief for many of the non-prostitution-related offenses that they commit as 
a result of being trafficked—offenses for which they lack personal 
culpability. They would also be able to obtain necessary relief through an 
ideal, non-criminal outlet. As such and for the reasons discussed above, a 
trafficking victim affirmative defense statute that resembles Kentucky’s 
framework but that adds a causation requirement is the ideal approach. 
                                                                                                     
 103. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170 (allowing a person “charged with an offense 
that is not a violent crime” to assert an affirmative defense as a victim of human trafficking). 
 104. See LAFAVE, supra note 41, at § 9.7(b) (noting that, under the common law and 
most modern penal codes, duress cannot excuse murder). 
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C. Adopting a Multi-Faceted, Collaborative Approach 
It is important to point out that the solutions proposed in this Article, if 
adopted by states, would not be dispositive of the criminal justice system’s 
inadequacies with respect to identifying and protecting trafficking victims. 
In considering how to adequately address the problem of identifying and 
protecting trafficking victims, legislatures should consider adopting several 
approaches to operate concurrently with, not in lieu of, a trafficking victim 
affirmative defense.105  
For example, the Honorable Toko Serita106 argues that “law 
enforcement and prosecutors should make it a priority to identify potential 
victims of trafficking” by learning about the realities and complex 
dynamics of sex trafficking.107 She also argues that states should “develop a 
coordinated judicial response to the problem” that would require judges to 
understand: (1) human trafficking and how the courts intersect with 
potential victims of trafficking; (2) that prostitutes must be viewed as 
potential sex trafficking victims; (3) that identification of trafficking 
victims is extremely difficult, but is not impossible; and (4) that, once 
                                                                                                     
 105. Despite the fact that states seem to be increasingly proactive in their respective 
approaches to protect and rehabilitate human trafficking victims, their approaches, for the 
most part, remain binary and thus are not sufficiently “multi-faceted” to combat the 
complexities involved in protecting and rehabilitating trafficking victims. For example, 
although sixteen states have enacted vacatur statutes and eighteen states have enacted 
affirmative defense statutes, there are only six states that have adopted both forms of relief 
for trafficking victims. See supra Parts II.B, V.A (identifying Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming as the six dual-option states). This is 
puzzling, because common sense tells us that both forms of relief would work well in 
conjunction (e.g., an affirmative defense statute could excuse trafficking victims on the front 
end while a vacatur statute could operate on the back end by providing relief to trafficking 
victims who were convicted before the availability of an affirmative defense) and thus would 
only improve states’ abilities to protect and rehabilitate human trafficking victims. 
Abandoning this “one or the other” mentality among states is the focus of this Part. 
 106. Judge Serita is a New York City Criminal Court Judge and is currently the 
presiding judge of the Human Trafficking Intervention Court. See Serita, supra note 5, at 
635 n.* (introducing the author of the article, Judge Serita, and discussing her credentials).  
She issued the first opinion on New York’s sex trafficking vacatur statute and was the first 
judge to consider whether the substantive reach of New York’s section 440.10(1)(i) includes 
non-prostitution offenses. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (Consol. 2015) 
(establishing vacatur relief for sex trafficking victims); People v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 
765–66 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (granting a defendant’s motion to vacate convictions for 
prostitution and other offenses because the defendant was presumptively entitled to an 
affirmative defense under § 440.10(1)(i)); see also People v. L.G., 972 N.Y.S.2d 418, 427 
(Crim. Ct. 2013) (holding that section 440.10(1)(i) allows courts to vacate non-prostitution 
convictions). 
 107. Serita, supra note 5, at 657. 
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identified, trafficking victims should be provided with the necessary 
services to adequately address their situation.108 
The approaches for which Judge Serita advocates would complement 
the affirmative defense approach and would help to alleviate some of the 
problems that might otherwise undermine the effectiveness of the 
affirmative defense approach. For example, two obstacles that prevent 
trafficking victims from bringing post-conviction motions under vacatur 
statutes are (1) lack of knowledge about the availability of vacatur relief, 
and (2) lack of access to counsel.109 Presumably, these obstacles would 
similarly prevent trafficking victims from utilizing an affirmative defense, 
all things being equal, because they surface after arrest and before 
conviction. However, if a state were to enact an affirmative defense while 
also teaching law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges how to identify 
victims and appropriately foster their rehabilitation, then these obstacles 
certainly would not hinder trafficking victims’ abilities to exercise an 
affirmative defense to the extent that they would otherwise. A more 
thorough consideration of the effectiveness of the approaches that Judge 
Serita and others advance, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Conclusion 
Although states are increasingly taking measures to more adequately 
account for the interests of human trafficking victims, few of them have 
adopted solutions with enough teeth to make a noticeable difference. It is 
my hope, however, to shed some light on these shortcomings and to provide 
states with part of a framework that places enough emphasis on the proper 
rehabilitation and recovery of human trafficking victims.  
In this Article, I discussed the policy justification for affirmative 
defenses—that is, a lack of personal culpability—in an effort to 
demonstrate how a significant number of human trafficking victims fall 
within that justification and thus deserve their own affirmative defense. 
Additionally, I summarized states’ current trafficking victim affirmative 
defense statutes and analyzed their respective pros and cons in an effort to 
demonstrate which framework would be ideal for other states to adopt. 
Ultimately, this analysis indicated that Kentucky’s statute—with the 
addition of a causation requirement—would provide the ideal framework 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at 658. 
 109. Barnard, supra note 17, at 1480. 
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because it would necessarily extend coverage to non-prostitution-related 
offenses while also considering states’ important interests in preventing 
violent crime. Lastly, I want to stress again that the solution proposed in 
this Article is only part of a more expansive framework, one that states 
should adopt in their efforts to adequately provide trafficking victims with 
enough opportunities and resources to recover and, eventually, to live the 
normal lives that they deserve. 
